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Means Testing Social Security:  
Modeling and Policy Analysis 
Abstract 
Means testing can balance the need to provide adequate retirement incomes with the 
requirement that such provision is fiscally sustainable and economically efficient. Critics of the 
policy suggest that to reduce benefits as a retiree’s income and/or wealth increase is to 
discourage work and savings. Yet such distortions are small compared to those resulting from 
large earnings related pensions that, due to demographic change, require greater levels of 
financing via payroll taxes. Some form of means testing exists in most countries, usually 
involving small, safety-net schemes that target the poorest retirees (e.g., the Supplemental 
Security Income program in the U.S.). But an appropriately designed means-testing instrument 
can also be used to reduce the liability of large, publicly financed social security promises by 
excluding the affluent. This paper summarises means-testing design and implementation in a 
number of OECD countries as well as tackling key criticisms of means testing. In doing so, we 
discuss a number of recent, cutting-edge modelling approaches and empirical insights that 
examine economic impacts of means testing in the Australian and U.S. contexts.
Citation 
Chomik, Rafal, John Piggott, Alan D. Woodland, George Kudrna, and Cagri Kumru. 2015. 
“Means Testing Social Security: Modeling and Policy Analysis.” Ann Arbor, MI. University of 
Michigan Retirement Research Center (MRRC) Working Paper, WP 2016-337. 
http://www.mrrc.isr.umich.edu/publications/papers/pdf/wp337.pdf 
2 
1. INTRODUCTION
Means testing can balance the need for adequate incomes in retirement with economic efficiency 
objectives to an extent that is seldom appreciated by policymakers. It is an inexpensive way of 
ensuring a minimum level of retirement income. The means test may create disincentives to work 
and save for those wishing to target a certain benefit level, but such distortions are dwarfed by 
disincentives from much larger earnings related pensions with associated payroll taxes or social 
insurance premiums. 
While some form of targeting exists in most countries, it is rarely exploited to its full potential. 
Commonly, means testing is deployed in programs that address destitution, such as in the United 
States’ Supplemental Security Income program. An appropriately designed resource testing 
instrument can also be used to reduce the liability of large, publicly financed pension or social 
security promises by excluding the affluent. Policies of this kind are in place in only a few 
developed economies (e.g., Denmark, Australia, and Chile) but have recently been advocated to 
address both fiscal stress and inequality issues, notably by the IMF (2014). 1  
This paper summarises means-testing design and implementation issues as well as tackling a key 
criticism relating to the claimed distortions created by means testing. In doing so, we discuss a 
number of recent analytical and empirical insights based on state of the art macroeconomic 
modeling.  
Much of the background and analysis summarised in this paper takes its cue from the 
arrangements for the means-tested Age Pension scheme in Australia, one of the largest means-
tested programs in the OECD yet one of its the cheapest pension schemes. It also draws on recent 
work of Chomik and Piggott (2014a), Kudrna (2015), Dabbs and Kumru (2015), and Kumru, Piggott, 
and Thanopoulos (2015). 
2. MEANS TESTING AS A POLICY TOOL
In this section we consider the extent to which means testing is applied in retirement income 
systems around the world and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) countries. We also look at the different design elements and administrative issues related 
to means testing and the approaches that different countries have implemented. Finally we make 
note of recent proposals for means testing of Social Security before economic implications are 
discussed in Section 3. 
2.1. Prevalence of pension means testing 
Most pension systems are made up of a number of pension programs and there are different ways 
to classify these. One way is to think of them as: earnings related, universal, or targeted.  
1 IMF Policy Paper: “Fiscal Policy and Income Inequality,” January 23, 2014. 
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Under universal and earnings related programs, pension benefits are provided as a matter of right. 
Under means-tested programs such benefits are based on a comparison of a person's income, 
assets, some combination of these, or other proxy measures of disadvantage.  
These categories can be further subdivided. Earnings related schemes can be provided on the 
basis of: notional accounts or a defined benefit social insurance formula (e.g., U.S. Social Security); 
mandated occupational pensions (e.g., Korea); mandated but privately managed individual 
accounts (e.g., Australia); or via a public provident fund (e.g., Singapore). The financing is entirely 
or largely from contributions (usually a percentage of earnings) made by employers, workers, or 
both, with potential subsidies or tax concessions from government.  
Pure universal programs provide pensions to residents or citizens, regardless of employment 
history, income or means (e.g., New Zealand’s main pension scheme) and are typically 
noncontributory, social pensions funded by tax revenues. In other countries, universal benefits are 
provided as a basic flat-rate pension where benefits change with years of residence (e.g., 
Netherlands) or years of employment (e.g., United Kingdom), with financing either via tax or the 
contributory scheme of the pension system. 
Targeted, or means-tested programs, also often referred to as social pensions, base eligibility and 
level of benefit on individual or family resources. By their nature, means tested programs have a 
redistributive role and are funded from general taxation. 
Note that such programs do not have a monopoly on redistribution. Many earnings related 
schemes, including U.S. Social Security, often include a level of implicit, ex ante means testing via 
redistributive formulas or by making pension benefits subject to progressive tax, ex post.  
As shown in Figure 1, standard earnings-related schemes are the most common type of pension. 
About three-quarters of surveyed countries report the existence of such a program. These often 
co-exist with other types of schemes (e.g., U.S. Social Security and the means-tested Supplemental 
Security Income). A third of countries have some form of means tested pension and only 7% have 
a pure universal scheme. 
Yet while 57 of 174 countries report having a means tested pension scheme, many of these 
programs are very small and play a marginal role in retirement income provision. In Figure 2 we 
narrow our focus on the OECD, showing the proportion of the population aged 65 and older that 
receive means-tested pension benefits. The chart shows that only in four countries do such 
benefits extend to more than half of the older population (Denmark, Australia, Korea, and Chile) 
and only in two do these cover between a quarter and a third (Canada and the U.K.). 
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Figure 1. Prevalence of pension scheme by type, world (% of countries), 2012-2014 
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Figure 2. Coverage of targeted pensions, OECD countries (% of over 65s) 
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2.2. Designing a means test  
Developing a means-tested pension scheme requires defining basic rules that fall into three 
categories: basic eligibility, scope of resource testing, and benefit value (i.e., the operation of the 
means test itself).  
Who is eligible?  Most countries apply current residence (or citizenship) requirements for 
eligibility (e.g., U.K. and Belgium). It is also common to require a certain number of years in a 
lifetime, either after a certain age or within a certain number of years of claiming the pension. In 
Australia eligibility requires residence of at least 10 years with one continuous period of at least 
five years.  
The other basic criterion is age. This is consistent with the policy’s purpose—to provide financial 
support to those who have largely depleted their productive capacity. As with other types of 
pension schemes, fairness and sustainability are relevant to the choice of access age. The average 
pension age in the OECD declined between 1950 and the mid-1990s, but has since been increasing 
in most OECD countries (and equalizing between the sexes; Chomik and Whitehouse, 2010). 
Australia has legislated to increase its Age Pension age to 67. A further increase to age 70 has been 
announced. If enacted, it will be the highest legislated pension access age in the OECD. Eligibility 
age for means-tested schemes are not always the same as that for other parts of the pension 
system: Private pensions are often available earlier, while public, earnings-related schemes 
sometimes allow for a “retirement window” between specified ages with actuarial adjustments to 
pension benefits. Such adjustments are more difficult to implement with a means-tested pension. 
In Chile, initial eligibility is based on the “technical targeting instrument,” a formula that calculates 
whether the household is in the poorest 60% of the population, using information on assets, 
income, earning capacity, and degree of child dependence. 
Which resources are tested? Whether and how each class of asset or source of income is included 
is usually the outcome of trade-offs between comprehensiveness to minimize avoidance 
behaviour, the feasibility of credible valuation, and political sensitivity.  
In Denmark, there are two types of means-tested pensions: one that is income tested and a 
smaller pension that is asset tested. In Chile, once the technical targeting instrument is passed, 
only the income from other pensions is assessed. In Australia, the means test consists of separate 
income and asset tests, with the pension amount determined by the lower benefit level of the 
two. The setting of test parameters means that the income test tends to be binding for more 
people. Having a separate asset test takes account of the fact that people can live off both asset 
income and principal and ensures that, where individuals own significant wealth, it is not simply 
shielded from the income test by investment in low-income-producing assets. Secondary 
residences, such as holiday homes, are also captured under the assets test.  
How resources are assessed can have a bearing on behavioural outcomes (see Section 3). For 
example, excluding earnings may incentivize work, and excluding pension income may incentivize 
pension saving. For example, in Australia, the total labor-earnings disregard is valued at about 13% 
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of average full-time earnings. An asset test can also exempt the family home. Empirical 
assessments in Australia do not suggest that people spend down their assets to receive more Age 
pension (Wu et al. 2015), though it is unclear the extent to which people overinvest in their family 
home to gain pension income. 
Whose resources should be included – the individual’s, those of a family unit, or household? 
Pooled resources are usually more indicative of need. Consistent with the approach that targeted 
benefits are paid based on means, it’s often the case that couples are assessed jointly. In Chile, the 
whole household is taken into consideration. 
How much benefit is paid?  The operation of the means test: Determining how much means-
tested benefit is paid requires specification of three sets of parameters: the maximum benefit, the 
disregard (an initial threshold or ‘free area’ of income or assets that is not tested), and the taper 
(or withdrawal) rate. These are illustrated in Figures 3 and 4 as they apply to selected OECD 
countries with the largest coverage of means-tested pensions (Denmark, Australia, Chile, Canada, 
and the United Kingdom) plus the United States.  
The maximum benefit: Choosing a maximum level of benefit is value-laden and relates to social 
views regarding adequate pensions. A number of benchmarks can guide this decision: absolute 
measures such as a basket of goods; or relative measures such as minimum wages, community 
budget standards, or relative poverty lines. For example, Australia opted to benchmark the 
maximum Age Pension to a given proportion of average wages, based on poverty studies. This 
translates to a benefit of approximately 28% and 42% of Male Total Average Weekly Earnings for 
singles and couples, respectively. In other countries where large means tested schemes exist, the 
maximum benefit tends to be lower. In fact, it ranges between 15 and 20% of average full-time 
earnings (Figure 3). In Korea, which also has a large means tested pension component (not shown 
in Figure 3), the maximum is around 5% for singles and 8% for couples. 
The different benefit levels for singles and couples take account of the cost-sharing economies of 
scale available to households. The majority of OECD countries maintain such a difference in non-
contributory pension benefit levels (OECD, 2013).  
The disregard: While the maximum amount affects the pension received by those at the bottom 
of the income (or asset) distribution, the disregard and taper determine how those with greater 
means are affected. These instruments can also act as useful policy levers to control the receipt of 
pensions and the benefit level. As noted earlier, the income test can include an additional 
disregard for earned income to encourage mature age labor-force participation.  
Australia is one of only few counties with a broader means test under which both income and 
assets are assessed. However, the asset test is far more generous compared to the other countries 
(Figure 4). Within its asset test, the level of assets disregarded is higher for renters than home 
owners, to reflect a greater need for renters to store savings in what would otherwise be 
assessable assets. 
.   
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Figure 3. Design of income test, Selected OECD countries, 2012-2014 
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Note: Avg. worker earnings: full-time adult total gross wages before deductions, including overtime and employee 
cash supplements); Based on single pensioner; In Chile, the test is against pension income only, but requires passing 
‘technical targeting instrument,’ a formula based on assets, income, earning capacity, and degree of child 
dependence. In Canada there are two types of means-tested pensions: Guarantee Income Supplement (shown here) 
and a basic pension, which is income tested and withdrawn at a taper of 15% beyond about 150% of average earnings. 
Source: Authors’ compilation based on country sources and OECD (2013). 
Figure 4. Design of asset test, Selected OECD countries, 2012-2014 
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Note: Based on single (home-owning) pensioner. In Australia, assessable assets exclude owner occupied housing. In 
Denmark, two means tested pension elements exist, one is income tested, the other is asset tested. Source: Authors’ 
compilation based on country sources and OECD (2013).  
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The taper: Beyond the disregard, the benefit is reduced for every extra dollar of income (or assets) 
based on a taper. In the countries shown in Figure 3, the income test taper ranges from about 30% 
for Denmark and Chile to 100% for the U.S. In the U.K., there are two parts to the taper, with 100% 
on the “Minimum Guarantee” and 40% on the “Savings Credit” part of the means tested pension.  
A shallower taper is more generous but will mean that less of the pension is clawed back, making 
it more expensive and affecting more people up the income or asset distribution. Taking Australia 
as an example, where the taper is 50% beyond the threshold, a single person with a private 
income of just over $30,000 (US, PPP) still receives some Age Pension.  
With the Australian pension asset test, every $1000 in excess of the disregard results in $1.50 less 
pension per fortnight (or $39 p.a.).2  Since the asset test is designed to capture those holding low-
income-producing assets, it has a large disregard but an aggressive taper. Nevertheless, it results 
in a couple being able to hold more than a combined $850,000 (US PPP) in assets, in addition to 
their home 
2.3. Administering the means test 
A common criticism of the means test is that it is administratively burdensome. Yet various 
procedures can be deployed to make the means test administratively manageable and remain 
effective. Several lessons can be drawn from the means test implementation experience of 
countries such as Australia.3 
Integrating operations: One method to reduce costs is to integrate services and generate 
economies of scale and scope. Merging customer-facing government services relating to social 
security, employment, education and health benefits can be provided by a single agency on behalf 
of client departments. Such initiatives have been implemented to a greater or lesser extent in 
Australia and the U.K. Alternatively, it may be possible to “piggyback” means-testing operations on 
the back of existing arrangements; for example by way of the tax system, as has been done for the 
Canadian pension and, to some extent, for a proportion of U.S. Social Security that is subject to 
tax. 
Streamlining assessment: Administering a means tested scheme requires processing an initial 
claim, with the requisite assessment, and dealing with existing claims, which may require 
subsequent reassessments.  
To some extent, an initial claim entails similar processes and costs found in any payment system: 
identity, age, residency, and bank account details.  For means testing, it involves the initial 
collection and assessment of income and asset information. Where benefits are tested only 
against other pensions income (e.g. Chile), the procedure becomes simpler. Indeed, in countries 
with low administrative capacity, this is one viable way of providing minimum pensions.  
                                                          
2 Increasing to withdrawal of $3 per $1000 of assets from 2017. 
3  See Chomik and Piggott, 2014a (or http://www.humanservices.gov.au/customer/services/centrelink/age-
pension)for more details about current procedures in Australia. 
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Some assessments are easier than others. For example, in Australia, about 8% of assessments, 
involving 2% of benefits paid were deemed complex, involving income from business holdings or 
trusts (ANAO, 2007).  
Reassessments of circumstances can be triggered by recipients who are asked to report significant 
changes. A proportion of recipients are registered as a “variable reporters” and need to report 
earnings on a regular basis.  But automatic reassessments of financial investments also take place 
every six months, where information about values of listed securities and managed investments 
are linked. 
Both the initial assessment and further self-reporting can be made via online systems. Though, as 
the U.K. government is discovering with implementing its Universal Credit system, face-to-face 
services cannot be ignored. In Australia, current self-service options include a smartphone app 
that allows pensioners to update contact details, report labor income, view payments and capture 
and upload documents (DSS, 2013) 
Establishing a quality control framework: It is important to put in place a framework of 
prevention, detection and deterrence of fraud and error. For example, in Australia this involves an 
automated sample survey and audit that identifies systematic problems, whether these are 
related to errors by customer, staff, procedure, or guidance material (ANAO, 2012).  
Simplifying design: Rules around the design of means tested benefits can complicate and add 
costs to administrative processes. This is one of the drivers for the U.K. implementing its Universal 
Credit system, which seeks to merge six means tested programs for working age people into one. 
In Australia, the income test is designed to be less generous than the asset test. This makes the 
processes cheaper since income is easier to identify and value than some assets. In addition, 
income from financial assets is assessed on a “deemed” basis, using a set rate, rather than by examining 
actual asset income received. 
Administrative costs: Taken together, a number of features can contribute to the operational cost 
efficiency of a means-testing regime.  
It is not easy to isolate the cost of administering the means test itself, let alone compare it to an 
alternative of collecting and keeping over 30 years’ worth of social security claims. In terms of 
overall operational costs of the benefit system, we calculate that benefit administration of the 
Australian Age Pension (including depreciation of assets) costs approximately 3.6% of total benefit 
outlays (Chomik and Piggott 2014a). It assumes equal administrative effort across all benefits. This 
is similar to our calculation of the cost of administering existing claims of the means tested 
element of the U.K.’s pension system: about 4% of average payment (NAO, 2011; DWP, 2012). 
By comparison, administrative expenses of the U.S. Social Security Administration are estimated at 
around 1.4% of total benefit outlays in 2013 (SSA, 2014). Administering New Zealand’s universal 
pension, one of the simplest pension schemes in the OECD, is estimated to cost approximately 
0.3% of benefit outlays (Chomik and Piggott 2014a)). 
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2.4. Outcomes of means testing  
So what are the practical outcomes of running a large means tested pension program compared to 
an earnings related one? Chomik and Piggott (2014a) and Chomik and Piggott (2014b) compare 
the poverty and fiscal outcomes for Australia and the United States. They use a poverty line 
measure that is equivalent to that used in the US, to show that elderly poverty is less prevalent in 
Australia than in the US. Using the OECD convention of drawing the line at 50% of median income, 
elderly poverty rates can still be considered low in Australia when home ownership is taken into 
account. Yates and Bradbury (2010) show that the elderly poverty rate is 13.5% after taking 
account of housing costs (like in the US, many older people in Australians own their own homes).  
While providing an adequate level of retirement incomes, fiscal costs of Australia’s public pension 
are lower than in the U.S. (3.6% compared to 4.8% in the US). Spending is projected to remain 
lower under current policy settings until at least mid-century (4.9% versus 6% in U.S.). The two 
countries have a similar demographic trajectory, so the lower levels of spending flows from the 
different pension design features.4 The Australian Age Pension remains affordable because public 
liability, rather than increasing with a claimant’s earnings, decreases with means. 
2.5. Means testing proposals for U.S. Social Security 
US Social Security is a good example of an earnings related scheme under fiscal pressure due to 
population aging. Unsurprisingly, reforming the system to limit future pension liabilities is 
particularly topical in the US, with means testing offering one solution. 
Past reforms have already introduced an element of implicit means testing to improve finances. 
The benefit formula has progressive features (taking account of earnings differences before 
retirement) and changes in the 1980s and 1990s have made an increasing proportion of Social 
Security subject to income taxes, some of which flow back into the pension fund (SSA 2015b; 
which takes account of income differences in retirement). 
Still, costs are expected to increase and are outpacing contributions. According to the Social 
Security Administration (SSA 2015a), the current median estimate year by which the trust fund is 
expected to deplete is 2033. 
Past studies looked at ways of introducing explicit means testing into Social Security. Baker and 
Rho (2011) estimated the fiscal impact of a withdrawal rate of 10% or 20% for income levels 
beyond about 87% or 218% of average earnings5. Comparing these parameters to those in Figure 3 
                                                          
4 Note, however, that comparability is difficult. For example, the comparison is complicated by the inclusion of the 
Disability Support Pension for Australia and Disability Insurance for the US. Excluding these costs for Australian reveals 
that the cost of the Age and Service pension is 2.9% of GDP, increasing to 3.6% by the 2050s (Treasury 2015). 
Equivalent figures for the U.S. are not reported for the OADSI (Old Age, Survivor and Disability Insurance; SSA 2015a). 
Furthermore, differences in projections also depend on long-term assumptions. For example, compared to Australian 
Treasury assumptions (e.g., Treasury 2015), OADSI projections assume slightly higher future productivity and fertility – 
which will make the relative cost appear lower compared to more pessimistic assumptions used in Australia. 
5 See note to Figure 3 regarding definition of average earnings.  
11 
 
shows that such a means test would only start reducing benefits at a point that is higher up the 
income distribution than in other countries with large means tested pillars. They found that costs 
would reduce by between 0.58% and 4.65% without accounting for behavioural responses, and 
between 0.07% and 2% given an arbitrarily defined behavioural response.  
The SSA provides regular analysis of different reforms including imposing an income tested 
reduction in benefits of between zero and 50% for people with incomes between about 120% and 
240% of average earnings (double for couples)6. Again, this captures only the high end of the 
benefit income distribution. The costs savings were found to be low, improving the long-range 
actuarial balance by 10%, which would not alter the forecast for the year in which OASDI assets 
are depleted. 
A proposal by The Heritage Foundation (2011) was to reform Social Security into a means tested 
social insurance program. The proposed parameters comprised a maximum benefit of $14,400, or 
about 30% of average earnings, a disregard of 115% of average earnings, and a taper of 26%, 
which would mean people on about 230% of average earnings would receive no benefit. As above, 
comparing such numbers to Figure 3 shows that the proposed means test is weak relative to other 
countries. The authors also suggested complementing such a reform with a mandatory private 
savings – creating a pension system not dissimilar to that seen in Australia. The plan was 
estimated to see continuous reductions in spending on Social Security, halving (as a proportion of 
GDP) the projected cost in 2035. 
Many opponents to such reforms cite the distortions and inefficiencies that arise as a result of 
means testing. We turn to such economic considerations in the next section. 
3. ANALYSIS OF ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF MEANS TESTING 
A common concern about means testing is how it affects incentives and distorts economic activity. 
Yet, recent analytical insights reveal that means-tested programs can enhance economic efficiency 
because they cost less and distort fewer decisions than alternative arrangements. But the analysis 
also highlights how parameter settings matter. The optimal means test requires careful design to 
take account of a number of complex interactions.  
In what follows we consider the results of three papers that use state of the art methodology to 
study means testing, Kudrna (2015), Dabbs and Kumru (2015), and Kumru, Piggott and 
Thanopoulos (2015). The papers are readily applicable to discussions about reforming schemes 
such as U.S. Social Security.  
3.1. The usual starting point for understanding incentives 
A means test reduces pension benefits for those who have higher incomes and savings. It 
therefore acts like a tax. In many cases, this is on top of actual taxes and other income related 
benefits. The result is captured by measuring “Effective Marginal Tax Rates” (EMTRs). High EMTRs 
                                                          
6 The results are available on the SSA website (reference for this reform option is B7.7). 
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reduce incentives to work and save for individuals close to or within the withdrawal range. Why 
earn an extra dollar if it reduces the benefits you would otherwise get? 
But EMTRs are only part of the story. Unfortunately, many analyses of means test incentives start 
and end there. The full account involves an analysis of trade-offs between EMTRs, the number of 
people affected by the targeting, and other explicit taxes in the economy and across different 
stages in life.  
Indeed, a full analysis requires us to be clear about the benchmark. Are we comparing a means 
tested program to a universal payment such as seen in New Zealand, a progressive social security 
scheme as seen in the United States, or to a world with no pension system at all?  
Take the U.S. Social Security as an example. To reject targeted cuts is to maintain a status quo in 
which government will need to re-fund the program by raising contributions (either via payroll or 
other taxes) – also introducing disincentives to work and save. 
3.2. Modeling approach: interactions across the economy and over time 
A standard procedure for comparing alternative policy characteristics is to analyse the aggregate 
changes when we solve the model under alternative structures (bearing in mind the differential 
impacts on different groups of people during and after the transition). The model needs to be one 
in which agents and firms can make choices through these behavioural functions. State of the art 
modeling of this type involves the Overlapping Generations (OLG) models which can track agents’ 
employment, consumption, saving paths over their entire life with different agents being at 
different stages of this path at each given year.  
 
Such modeling allows us to see not only differences in work, consumption, and savings but also to 
assess wellbeing. This is based on the idea that there is some aggregation of individual wellbeing 
which can be thought of as the overall wellbeing in the economy. Policy interventions change the 
level of wellbeing for individuals via redistribution or induced changes in economic behaviour and 
choice. The changes can be quantitatively evaluated based on a set of functions relating to utility 
trade-offs between choices that are theoretically defined but which are calibrated to comply with 
empirically confirmed outcomes at the aggregate level.  
3.3. Is a pension system better than nothing at all? 
In a simple framework, the absence of a pension appears best. Starting with the seminal work on 
the topic, Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), using an OLG model, show that imposing any pension 
system on an economy can be economically inefficient and welfare reducing. This stylised result is 
based on the idea that a pension system introduces taxes and payments that inhibit and alter the 
otherwise free financial choices that individuals are assumed to want and are capable of making.  
But results change with more realistic assumptions. In reality, choices are more restricted than 
those originally modelled. A number of risks, such as income shocks and the possibility of outliving 
ones savings, may be uninsurable. Incorporating risk and incomplete insurance markets into an 
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OLG model improves the impact of public pension programs on household welfare (Hugett and 
Venture 1999; Nishiyama and Smetters 2007; Hugett & Parra 2010).  
Another simplification relates to the ability of individuals to commit to saving. The lack of self-
control means that individuals incur a cost from the temptation to consume now at the expense of 
their future self. In such a setup, individuals may value the commitment device inherent in pension 
schemes (Kumru and Thanopoulos 2011). 
Dabbs and Kumru echo the findings by Auerbach and Kotlikoff: even when the benefits of 
insurance inherent in a pension program are taken into account, they find that overall welfare is 
lower with a public pension, as defined in their model, than under no pension at all. That is, the 
incentive distortions in having a pension scheme dominate the benefits from insurance of having 
any scheme, whether such a scheme is means-tested and specified to Australian parameters or an 
earnings related PAYG resembling U.S. Social Security (but at the same cost as the Australian 
scheme).  
3.4. Is means testing better than a universal pension?  
If society seeks to provide some minimum level of pension benefits, should it do so universally or 
by way of a means test? Kudrna answers this question in a world calibrated to the Australian 
economy, modeling the difference between Australia’s means tested pension and a hypothetical 
pension scheme in which the Age Pension is offered to everyone at the maximum benefit level.  
He finds that replacing the means test with a universal pension raises the pension outlay by 42% 
to over 4% of GDP. The increased pension outlay requires a proportional 11% tax increase in 
average and marginal income tax rates (or a 28% increase in the consumption tax). Households 
respond to this hypothetical policy change by reducing their lifecycle labor supply and saving. 
These behavioural effects are due to (i) higher pension payments acting as a substitute for private 
retirement income and (ii) labor and saving disincentives arising particularly from higher 
progressive income taxation.  
Consequently, relative to the existing means testing structure, the switch to a universal pension 
generates negative effects on per capita labor supply, domestic assets and consumption, which in 
the long run decline by 1.4%, 4.4% and 2.3%, respectively. Similarly to related literature on the 
means testing of public pensions (e.g., Kumru and Piggott 2009; Tran and Woodland 2014), this 
counterfactual policy also reduces average welfare in the long term. The conclusion is that, 
relative to a universal pension, targeting is welfare-improving in the long run. 
3.5. Within a means tested program, how aggressive should the means test be?  
In general high tapers appear to be advantageous. Both Kudrna and Dabbs and Kumru find that a 
100% taper results in least distortion and highest welfare and that a 0% taper (i.e. a universal 
pension) is most distorting. The effect is driven by the lower cost of the pension program under 
aggressive means tests since the higher taper restricts the number of people who receive benefits.  
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Kudrna shows that strengthening the Age Pension income test in Australia from 50% to 100% 
could reduce pension outlays by 17%, allowing for lower income tax rates to maintain a balanced 
government budget. This has positive effects on per capita labor supply, domestic assets and 
average welfare in the long run. Interestingly, average labor supply at older ages also increases 
since most older households see their pensions reduced, with some elderly not qualifying for any 
pension and, therefore, no longer facing high EMTRs on their earnings. The results also highlight 
the importance of transitional effects of the changes to means-tested pensions, which show 
significant welfare loses to current retirees experiencing large cuts in their pensions. 
Dabbs and  Kumru and Kumru, Piggott and Thanopoulos also demonstrate how lower costs drive 
the welfare-improving outcomes of a 100% taper shown above by running an additional 
experiment where they hold the total pension program cost fixed while changing the taper. They 
do this by adjusting the maximum benefit level alongside the taper. Dabbs and Kumru show that 
the advantage of a high taper disappears if the program cost is constant. That is, a very high 
benefit that is withdrawn aggressively and only goes to a few people can be worse than a very low 
benefit that goes to everyone regardless of income. 
On the other hand, Kumru, Piggott and Thanopoulos suggest that a withdrawal rate of 80% is 
optimal when comparing taper rates while keeping costs constant. The authors argue that in their 
model, calibrated to the U.S. economy, the 80% taper allows a higher fraction of the population 
(including those with higher incomes) to enjoy public retirement benefits than if the taper were 
100%, but at the same time, the fact that the taper rate is not very low, allows for the maximum 
benefit (mainly going to those on lower incomes) to remain high.  
The analysis implies that some results can be sensitive to the modeling methodology, especially 
the nature of the revenue requirement. But one clear set of conclusions is as follows: (1) a high 
taper lowers program costs; which (2) lower taxes necessary to fund the program; which (3) 
reduces disincentives across the many (that pay tax throughout their lives); despite (4) increasing 
them for the few (who face high EMTRs at point of receipt). 
3.6. Should labor earnings be excluded from the means test?  
It is impractical for most people to structure their life decisions and hours of work, especially 
earlier in life when decisions about education and occupation are made, to target a particular 
means test position. It’s more likely that people of retirement age are more affected by the means 
test.  
For this reason the Australian Age Pension means test already excludes a small amount of labor 
earnings from the Age Pension income test in addition to the standard income disregard. This 
means that older people keep more of their pension even if they continue working. Kudrna 
examined the economic and welfare implications of extending this policy further, by exempting all 
earnings.  
He found that exempting earnings has much smaller aggregate effect compared to increasing the 
taper. This is due to the relatively small numbers of people affected and given their assumed low 
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productivity rates.7 More importantly, he finds that the labor earnings exemptions from means 
testing have largely positive implications for the average labor supply of older Australians. This 
result supports the findings of empirical literature that examined labor supply responses to 
changes in the earnings tests of social security benefits in other developed countries (e.g., 
Friedberg (2000) for the US). 
3.7. Is means testing better than an earnings related scheme?  
If policymakers were choosing a system based on economic efficiency within a given spending 
envelope, should they choose an earnings related PAYG or a means tested one? According to the 
model in Dabbs and Kumru, the means tested version may be preferable. 
This result is not immediately obvious and indeed it appears to be small. It depends on the effects 
of policy on different parts of the population, which in turn depends on the model and policy 
specification. For example, the authors show that low earners would receive a means tested 
benefit regardless of their behaviour and are unaffected by disincentives at the point of receipt. 
The authors argue that under an earnings related, PAYG system of the same total cost, such low 
earners receive lower pension benefits than they would under means testing, but their low 
earnings mean that they cannot increase their labor supply sufficiently to increase retirement 
income to the means tested level. As a result, the utility of low earners is higher under means 
testing than PAYG. By contrast, the authors claim that higher earners are affected by the means 
test disincentives, which make them save less than they would under PAYG and lowers their 
utility. Taken together, the authors conclude that replacing a PAYG system with one that costs the 
same but is means tested results in less work effort, but more savings and higher welfare. 
While this analysis is interesting, the policy lessons are unclear. The more pressing concern for 
policy makers is whether means testing can reduce the cost of earnings related pensions without 
creating overwhelming distortions. Kumru, Piggott and Thanopoulos show the welfare outcomes 
for a PAYG earnings related scheme compared to a means tested scheme in a standard OLG 
framework (as well as with non-standard behavioural outcomes – see below). They find that the 
cost savings from a means tested scheme results in fewer overall distortions and increased welfare 
compared with an earnings related PAYG scheme. Indeed, the higher the taper the better the 
outcomes. 
3.8. Relaxing assumptions 
As noted above, in the real world many people don’t behave in the way some models assume. 
Many individuals, regardless of income, find it difficult to save even if their over-arching 
preference is to do so. Kumru, Piggott and Thanopoulos consider this scenario by employing an 
OLG model with uninsurable individual income shocks, borrowing constraints and missing annuity 
                                                          
7 The authors assume an inverse U relationship between productivity (and wages) and age. Since the model outcomes 
depend on decisions taken by individuals, such an assumption is necessary to achieve an inverse U relationship 
between labor force participation and age. That is, as one’s productivity and wages drop, more people choose leisure 
over work and retire. 
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markets, calibrated to the U.S. economy. Importantly, the model also assumes that individuals lack 
the self-control to save.  
Given this setting, how do the answers to the above questions change? Where self-control 
problems exist, means testing still appears to be more advantageous than providing universal 
pensions. The higher tapers are also favoured, even more so than in a model where people have 
standard preferences. Finally, the authors find that the cost saving from any means testing at all, 
whether with a taper of 20% or 100%, is welfare-improving when compared to a PAYG earnings 
replacement scheme.8   
4. CONCLUSION 
In an era of population aging and fiscal pressures, better targeting of precious public funds is an 
option that can still ensure an adequate level of basic retirement income.  
This paper examined the nature of means testing as a policy tool, its design features, 
implementation and outcomes. It also presented the latest analytical insights from a set of state of 
the art models, where possible relating the Australian and U.S. pension structures.  
The bottom line from such analysis is that disincentives created from high contributions to fund an 
earnings related pension scheme tend to outweigh those created be a cheaper means tested 
scheme. It suggests that reforming a pension scheme such as U.S. Social Security by employing 
appropriate targeting structure could generate significant savings.  
Means tests, where they do exist, are often crudely and arbitrarily designed and have received 
limited attention from academic researchers. For policymakers they represent a policy lever with 
an unrealised potential.   
                                                          
8 Still, if working within the same spending envelope, as with above studies, the paper finds that, where agents have 
problems with self-control, an earnings related scheme is might provide better outcomes than either universal or 
means tested schemes. 
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